

## FREEDOM AND RESTRICTIONS

## STATE AND ECONOMY IN THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1570-1670 \*

by

*Marjolein 't Hart**1. Introduction*

‘In any event, it was surely one of Europe's great advantages that its first capitalist entrepreneurs worked and flourished in autonomous city-states, hence political units where the influence of landed wealth was necessarily limited [...]. Fragmentation, as we have seen, entailed competition, specifically competition among equals.’<sup>1</sup> Thus David Landes explained the exceptional economic growth of early modern Europe. The absence of a single ecumenical empire, together with division into city-states and nation-states, created the conditions under which resources, science, and technology came to be used in an international contest for power.

The political structure of the Dutch Republic (1579-1795) was a microcosm of the European one. Other parts of Europe had known fragmentation into small political units too, but by the seventeenth century few countries had such a complex constitution as the Dutch confederation of provinces. The central body of the system consisted of the States General and the Council of State, occasionally ‘headed’ by one of the Princes of Orange. Yet the provinces remained sovereign. Within those provinces, cities had inherited a special legal status, which was further enhanced during the time of the Revolt. Another area in which there was heterogeneity was that, although Calvinism was the preferred religion among public authorities, several other major denominations were tolerated. A ‘Dutch’ community with common cultural structures and legitimacy norms simply did not exist. Even the provinces were confederations of rural areas and towns rather than integrated political systems.<sup>2</sup>

Such fragmentation into semi-autonomous units had a major impact upon the execution of economic policy by the central state. Nevertheless, following Jonathan Israel, the Dutch state was ‘exceptionally strong and efficient’ as compared to other major European states, with a ‘capacity [...] to protect and promote the vital interests of the first world-trade entrepôt’.<sup>3</sup> Israel's view of a strong state seems to ignore the advantages of a federation. Was Dutch economic development fostered by fragmentation and competition, or was it due to efficiency in economic policy?

This article examines the array of capacities of the Dutch state and the impact of the internal contest for power during 1570-1670. First, the main tasks of the central state are delineated, such as the protection of national territory and economic war policies. Tariffs, monetary reforms, and monopolies that were imposed nationwide will be discussed next. Then, the economic policies of the provinces are raised, dealing with fiscal strategies, rural policy, and methods to promote trade and industry. Finally, policy-making of the cities is discussed, dealing with guilds, urban settlement, and welfare.

Throughout these levels, however, several categories of economic policy can be discerned. A first category concerns the creation of favourable conditions for production bearing indirectly upon the economy, such as defence and the safeguarding of property rights, health policies and care for the poor. A second category comprises more direct economic involvement, by granting monopolies and subsidies, and by generating demand through public expenditure. Finally, government bodies can also act as economic actors, for example by constructing wharves, mills, or foundries. As will be seen, this third category was virtually nonexistent in the Dutch case, because the central state, which limited itself to more indirect economic policies, left most direct economic exertions to local authorities.

*2. Defence and economic war policies*

Defence against outside attack was delegated to the States General and the Council of State in The Hague. An army of the Republic was set up, under the command of the Stadhouder of Holland, and also a navy, divided over five admiralty boards. As most other administrative tasks were taken care of by regional and local authorities, defence expenditures formed the lion's share of the central budget. Only a minor portion was devoted to central

administration, foreign policy, and service of the Republic debt.<sup>4</sup>

On the whole, defence policy proved effective during the period under consideration, at least as it concerns the defence of the territory of the Republic. Yet it required a dramatic increase of overall expenditures. The 2.9 million guilders budgeted annually in the 1580s for the war against Spain increased to over 22 million guilders in the 1630s. These amounts fell after the conclusion of peace in 1648, but climbed again in the 1650s due to the first Anglo-Dutch War and the Dutch naval expedition to the Baltic. In the 1660s another peak was reached, caused by the second Anglo-Dutch War, with central expenses amounting to over 30 million guilders. Expenditures slowed down after the 1670s and were to increase again only in the eighteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

The demand generated by the central expenditures of the Republic affected mainly the area of provisioning. Naturally, troops and sailors had to be fed and dressed. These deliveries were mainly local, so that it was the surrounding areas of garrisons and admiralties that profited. Major orders resulted from the construction of vessels for the navy. However, due to mismanagement by the admiralties and because of failing payments by the provinces, fewer ships were actually built than originally planned. Therefore, in cases of foreign threat, most of the men-of-war needed had to be hired or bought. But in the 1650s matters improved, and at least sixty vessels were built.<sup>6</sup>

Another area of government demand was the construction of fortifications, which saw a boom in the late sixteenth century. Walls and fortresses were built on the order of city councils, but such works could also be ordered by the States General and the Council of State. The funding of these projects came partly from the central budget, partly from the province, and the remainder from the township. Bulwarks and ramparts were carefully designed by engineers, the most famous being Simon Stevin and Adriaan Anthonisz.<sup>7</sup>

The role of the central state as employer was limited, as the central government remained small. Only a couple of hundred civil servants came to be employed in government offices. The navy and the army were more important in this regard, although many of the troops - and even some of the officers - were foreigners.<sup>8</sup>

The expenses of the central government were only for a minor part (about one-fifth) covered by central fiscal revenues. The Republic imposed tariffs on incoming and outgoing goods, the so-called *convooien en licenten*, which were collected by the five admiralty boards. The income from these tariffs was spent directly for the protection of international trade and for warfare at sea. Furthermore, the central state imposed a tax on the wholesale of salt, a stamp duty, temporary taxes on beer and soap, and a duty on passports. These restricted revenues were generally used directly to cover the costs of the governing bodies in The Hague. And finally, taxes were introduced in the conquered areas and in the so-called Generality lands. But this tax income was small and the proceeds went to the local administration of those areas again.<sup>9</sup>

The remainder of the central budget, about 80%, was borne by the autonomous fiscal structures of the provinces. During the sixteenth century all provinces had constructed some sort of bureaucratic machinery, mainly for the purpose of tax collection. Each agreed on paying a fixed quota, ranging from a mere 3.5% for the poorest province, Overijssel, to 58% for Holland, the wealthiest province, housing almost half the Republic's population.<sup>10</sup>

Due to the crucial role of Holland in meeting the costs of war, that province exerted a strong influence upon the foreign policy of the Republic. Also, most federal institutions were located nearby the Holland provincial government in The Hague. Nevertheless, Holland always had to reckon with other provinces' preferences, because of the one-province-one-vote system in the States General.<sup>11</sup> This fact brought about an intensive tradition of bargaining and trade-off politics.

Of enormous significance for trade and industry were the economic war policies. The blockade of the access route to the port of Antwerp in 1585 and the closing of the Scheldt thereafter immediately ruled out one of the major competitors in international trade, namely, the Southern Netherlands. The merchants of Amsterdam and other Dutch ports profited tremendously. The blockade proved less advantageous for the harbours of Zeeland, though. In the short run, a city like Middelburg gained, as it managed to take over several of Antwerp's functions, yet in the long run international trade routes were shifted to the north, avoiding the Zeeland area altogether.<sup>12</sup>

Prohibitions of export to certain countries were rare. When there were prohibitions, the reasons were political, for example the embargo imposed on trade with France in 1657 and 1688 in response to French mercantilist measures, and on English trade during the wars in 1653 and 1665.<sup>13</sup> Another instrument was the Dutch river blockades, such as those imposed in the 1620s and 1630s. Several items were banned from export to nearby enemy territories, notably arms, ammunition, copper, and naval stores, but also foodstuffs, timber, and horse fodder. Such blockades were always highly controversial. In 1621-1622, for example, Holland reluctantly agreed, and only on the condition that herring, fish, and salt were exempted. Yet a couple of years later, several Holland towns would welcome the blockade on the eastern border. In this case, Haarlem and Leiden eagerly wished to shut out Westphalian manufactures, whereas the maritime harbours profited from the diversion of trade from the inland towns in Gelderland and Overijssel.<sup>14</sup>

At times, export bans with a more protectionist character were enacted. The measures were almost always ad hoc, such as a prohibition on the export of wool in 1591 in order to protect the Dutch textile industry, and a law in 1593 prohibiting the import of pins. Another set of laws dating from 1614 prohibited import of dyed woollens, and was followed by similar acts in 1634, 1650, and 1663, whereas a law of 1630 concerned tick weaveries. The latter were voted for because of the poor situation of the domestic industry. Explicitly in retaliation against protective measures by England, the import of English cloth was banned in 1651, at the instigation of Leiden drapers. Similar temporary reprisals were carried out against French mercantilist policies, the restrictions being abandoned again after the end of each of the Franco-Dutch wars. In the meantime, import duties for wool were always very low in order to stimulate the textile industry. After 1655, they were even absent.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. Tariffs, monetary reforms, and monopolies

Thus, although free trade was generally acclaimed, certain sectors in the United Provinces did have some measure of protection, albeit less than elsewhere in Europe.<sup>16</sup> But in the imposition of most other tariffs, the fiscal argument (to pay for the navy) was the primary motivation. Customs duties originated from the city *convooien*, which were transformed into provincial duties in the 1570s. They were followed by a general list of tariffs for the whole Republic in 1581 with the purpose of financing the war at sea. But it took a long time to obtain uniform levels. For example, in the 1590s Deventer still levied higher duties on beer produced by Dutch cities like Delft, Dordrecht, and Kampen than on beer coming from England, Lübeck, Hamburg, or Bremen. Another thorny issue was trade with the enemy. Prohibition of such trade resulted in frequent evasions and frauds. It proved more profitable to levy high duties instead. These duties on trade with the enemy were henceforth called *licenten*.<sup>17</sup>

A new list of customs duties was published in 1584, although due to strong opposition from Amsterdam and Enkhuizen, several duties had to be lowered. The first major increase was approved in 1603, in response to the poor financial situation of the admiralties. As a result of the Twelve Years' Truce, duties were lowered in 1609-1621, but with the resumption of war most duties returned to the 1603 level. Apart from some minor additions, tariffs remained at the same level up to the end of the war in 1648. Then, after an initial lowering, they were increased overall by one-third in 1651-1655.<sup>18</sup>

In addition, temporary duties existed for specific trade routes for which navy protection was not sufficient. In such cases, a board of directors was set up, whose services were paid for by a levy on cargo. An example of the latter was the board set up in Amsterdam in 1625 for trade with the Levant, which suffered severely from attacks by booty-seeking pirates. This board had the power to enforce the convoying and arming of ships. On occasion it negotiated with pirates, though usually with no effect. In 1631 another board was set up, this time for trade with the Baltic and Norway, because of continual attacks by Dunkirk privateers.<sup>19</sup>

Still, despite the enormous pressures of war and the impoverished condition of the navy, the ordinary tariffs of the Dutch Republic never exceeded 5%, which was quite low in comparison with other countries. After the 1620s the additional costs of the navy were increasingly paid out of provincial taxes. Higher customs duties were opposed by the influential merchant communities wishing to protect the Dutch position in international trade. An additional problem was that each of the five admiralties tried to favour the province and city in which it was stationed: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Middelburg, Hoorn (taking turns with Enkhuizen), and Dokkum (later Harlingen). Therefore, frauds in tariffs were deliberately condoned by local authorities so as to stimulate shipping at the expense of other ports. Thus, although import and export duties were decided upon centrally, much of the implementation remained local.<sup>20</sup>

The tariffs were at times highly disadvantageous for specific trading communities. Zeeland bitterly witnessed a further decline of its prosperity with the lifting of the blockade of the Flemish ports of Ostend, Nieuwpoort, and Blankenberge. As a grain-producing province, Zeeland eagerly desired higher duties on incoming cereals, whereas Amsterdam (and Holland) defended the 'free trade policy' for the benefit of its staple market. But within Holland disagreements existed too. The Truce period (1609-1621), with a lowering of tariffs, proved detrimental for the textile industry. Leiden, Delft, and Gouda soon pressed for an increase of tariffs on cloth to the wartime level. The situation improved only after the resumption of war. However, with the signing of the peace in 1648, import tariffs dropped, and again the industrial towns of Holland noticed a sharp drop in production due to cheap manufactured imports from Flanders, Liège, and Westphalia. Eventually, the 1651 tariff list was a compromise between manufacturing and trade-oriented towns.<sup>21</sup>

As with tariffs, monetary policy was a matter of coming to terms with conflicts of interest between regions. Depreciation was always much feared among trade-oriented circles. Yet even the maritime provinces had resorted to such despised measures. As soon as Holland and Zeeland became effectively independent in the 1570s, these

provincial governments devalued their silver coinage considerably. Moreover, each of the seven provinces, considering itself sovereign after liberation, claimed the right to mint money, which had hitherto been centralized in Dordrecht. Holland even had two mints (for its northern and southern halves), whereas several towns in the east part of the Republic had received imperial coining privileges in the Middle Ages. The output of these mints varied considerably in unit and alloy, bringing confusion to commercial transactions.<sup>22</sup>

The Mintmasters-General encountered strong provincial opposition in their efforts to increase supervision. But by the time of the Truce, the central government - mainly through effective policies of the Bank of Amsterdam and through strict regulation of the bullion market - managed to obtain a reasonably stable coin system based on the silver *daalder*. Rates of exchange were officially established by the States General. To maintain these standards, after 1647 the central government insisted that one-third of the foreign mints be reserved for minting purposes.<sup>23</sup>

Monetary reform was necessary after the value of silver in the standard coins had declined. In 1659, an official stamp was set on the distinction between real money and money of account, the terms being 'current' money and 'bank' money. The standard coin was assigned a lower intrinsic value, yet the *wisselbanken* were statutorily required to assess their coins at their former official values. The reform was accompanied by a temporary ban on the export of silver.<sup>24</sup>

In a more direct way, the central government influenced trade by granting monopolies to specific companies. In order to combat excessive competition in the Far Eastern trade in the 1590s, the authorities urged several merchant companies to merge in 1602, creating the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, or East India Company. This large-scale permanent enterprise obtained a monopoly on trade with the East Indies by decree of the States General. Initially the monopoly was to last ten years, but it was always renewed up to the end of the Republic.

Plans to set up a similar West India Company had been in the air as early as 1606, yet it was halted in view of the expected truce with Spain. In 1614, a four-year monopoly was granted by the States General to the *Compagnie van Nieuw Nederland* for trade in furs with North America. This monopoly was partly transferred to the West India Company in 1621, which came to dominate trade with the Americas. And in order to combat English whalers, the *Noordse Compagnie* was granted a monopoly on whaling, which lasted until 1642.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. Provincial strategies in taxation, trade, and rural policy

As noted above, few central taxes were imposed. Instead, the provinces retained fiscal autonomy, paying the required sums according to a fixed quota to the central government. Naturally, taxation strategies varied widely from one province to the other, due to the differing institutional make-up of the provincial governments. Inland, the semi-autonomous corporations of the gentry and the traditional division into rural areas weighed relatively more heavily. In the maritime west, cities had an overwhelming influence in provincial governments, where they outvoted the rural and noble delegates.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, everywhere the main argument for provincial taxation was fiscal, resulting in the levy of those duties which were likely to provoke the least resistance. The consequence was that traditional local duties endured, with some new taxes added only in the maritime regions.<sup>27</sup>

Another factor explaining the fiscal variety among the provinces has to do with the old crown domains that had passed into the hands of provincial authorities. Friesland was the province owning the most extensive domains, and therefore needing less recourse to taxation. But in most other provinces the extent of such domains had been drastically reduced. Many domains had been sold during the 1560s because of financial difficulties of Philip II, and the policy of the independent provinces themselves had been directed to sale of these lands too.

A further influence on fiscal strategies was the number of towns in the area. Urbanized regions could easily levy indirect taxes on consumption and trade, whereas rural districts had no choice but to obtain their funds from taxation of land. Taxes on property were less elastic and more difficult to assess as compared to excises and customs. This is not to say that taxation did not affect trade. In Holland, the province which levied the most excises, complaints were voiced over the heavy overall burden of taxation. The burden was not a figment of the imagination, as this province was depicted by foreign contemporaries, too, as being the most heavily taxed in Europe.<sup>28</sup>

A major side effect of the emphasis on public finance at the provincial level was the emergence of consolidated provincial debts. When expenses could not be paid out of current tax revenues, loans were contracted, which were converted by the provincial government into long-term obligations. The most famous example is the public debt of Holland, which sky-rocketed as a result of the Eighty Years' War. Payment of the debt was secured by a wide array of excises and occasional levies on property. Rates of interest were modest, declining from 8 to 12% in the late sixteenth century to only 4% at the end of the seventeenth century.<sup>29</sup> But the investments were highly secure, which was a major advantage for merchants wanting to spread their risks. Other secure investments were bonds sold by the Republic, the provinces of Zeeland and Utrecht, the five admiralties, and the major cities.<sup>30</sup> Manifold investors in

the debt (among them many town council members, responsible for voting on new taxes) profited increasingly from the state. Debt charges came to absorb more than half of the expenses of the province of Holland in the 1660s.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the high tax burden in the Republic, which was caused from first to last by war, taxation did to some extent stimulate commercialization. It instigated peasants to produce for the market and it channelled funds to the larger urban communities. And although fiscal demands were quite burdensome in the maritime west, urban capitalists invested huge sums in the countryside again by way of land reclamation and canals.<sup>32</sup>

Of course, such rural policies varied by region. Cities exerted a major influence in drainage boards, partly because so much land was owned by burghers, and partly because the main investors in polder projects were urban based. Supervision of dikes, dunes, and polders was traditionally entrusted to specific boards of *dijkgraven*, *heemraden*, and *waterschappen*. Maintenance of dikes and polders was an obligation divided among the households that benefited from it; the boards supervised the system and fined the negligent. In general, provincial authorities intervened only indirectly.<sup>33</sup>

Before the Revolt, supervision of sea dikes had been vested in provincial authorities. In the 1570s however, this tradition was largely neglected in Holland, and only revived after the floods of the 1670s. Occasionally, the province intervened, such as in 1587 over the neglected Schellingwoudse Dijk, for which the provincial government provided 2,500 guilders, and in 1610 for the construction of a dike near Callantsoog at an estimated cost of 60,000 guilders. Upon request of the island of Texel, provincial authorities also supervised construction of a sea dike. The province showed concern for the Westfriesche Zeedijk too, which they tried to improve by promising a monetary subsidy of 200,000 guilders.<sup>34</sup>

As in Holland, the local drainage boards in neighbouring Utrecht and Zeeland held much power. No provincial inspection existed, the provinces restricting their task to approving the decisions of the boards and settling disputes. In Zeeland, though, some financial support was provided by the province for impoverished polders bordering the sea, the so-called *calamiteuze polders*.<sup>35</sup>

In the province of Groningen, a much more active rural policy was pursued. Here, provincial inspection of sea dikes was a general rule, which can be explained by the fact that the province was a major landowner itself, after confiscation of former church lands in 1594. In 1650, the province even paid for two-thirds of the pileworks, the remainder of the financing being provided by landowners. In Friesland, too, the province exercised close scrutiny starting in 1579 through a provincial board of commissioners that oversaw the local drainage boards. This supervision proved effective, for example in 1610, when floods had devastated several sea dikes. As the repair work carried out by the local boards was insufficient, the province promulgated a rule that the dikes be improved to a specified height. Furthermore, common watermarks were established for whole regions and for sluices in particular, which was an important aid for shipping. Also, the dikes of the Middelzee were constructed by the province of Friesland.<sup>36</sup>

Polder construction was a major concern in Holland, Utrecht, and Friesland in particular, although most of the provincial intervention was indirect. Provinces offered tax exemptions to new landowners for a considerable period of time, bought land from unwilling participants, and granted far-reaching self-governing powers to the new polder boards. Holland and Utrecht were especially interested because of the damage to land from extensive peateries. Peat digging had created lakes, which reduced tax revenues from land. From 1592 and 1593 onwards, several decrees were issued by the provinces of Holland and Utrecht, stipulating that drainage boards were to be responsible for making the land fit to use again after the peat had been dug away. These measures proved little effective, though, and improvements came about only in the eighteenth century through the introduction of a specific tax called *stuiversgeld*.<sup>37</sup>

However, not all rural policies were aimed at the improvement of economic conditions in the countryside. In 1531, the towns of Holland had won in a conflict with landlords over trade and industry in rural areas. This *Order op de Buitenning* prohibited retail trade between countryfolk and townspeople and the establishment of new industries within the vicinity of towns. Cities frequently disputed the right of weighage in villages and tried to obstruct transport routes that avoided their markets.<sup>38</sup>

Urban powers became more extensive after the Revolt, as cities came to dominate the body politic. The provincial government of Groningen even granted the city of Groningen a highly disputed set of staple rights in 1599, which forced the surrounding countryside to conduct its trade through the city market. Brewing of beer by inhabitants of rural areas was prohibited too. In 1600, the States General even promulgated a rule, for the whole Republic, that all breweries outside cities had to be demolished.<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, some rural industry sprang up, at times even with the support of urban elites. Around Tilburg a significant woollen industry developed, as Leiden entrepreneurs wished to profit from low wage levels in the countryside. But the most famous example of a successful rural industrial area was the Zaanstreek in Holland. The villages there, which had been employed by Amsterdam in the wood trade, started to develop their own mills and

wharves, aided by their knowledge of trade routes, the low level of wages, the absence of guilds, cheap land, and an abundance of timber.<sup>40</sup>

Trade conflicts were frequent among cities too. The assignment of market rights, together with the authorization of weigh-houses, had been transferred to provincial authorities during the Revolt. Neighbouring towns bickered over the right to hold annual fairs. Claims by staple markets (such as Groningen and Dordrecht) even drew distant communities into the disputes.<sup>41</sup>

Due to conflicting interests of trading cities in Holland, shipping was hardly stimulated by this province. Only a couple of actions were undertaken, such as the deepening of the Dordsche Kil in 1599 and 1650, and the improvement of the Merwede in 1596. Some canals were dug, which improved communications between cities, in particular for the *trekschuit* system. The existing regular shipping services between towns, the *beurtveren*, were intensified too. The costs were borne by local communities and financed by way of fares and local duties. However, intercity rivalries prevented the digging of several new canals.<sup>42</sup>

Utrecht, a province less affected by such rivalry among cities, proved more active, and deepened the Vaartsche Rijn, widened the Eem River, and took care of the shallow parts of the Rhine and the Lek. The silting up of major rivers worried the inland provinces in particular. For rivers at the eastern border of the Republic, some funds were even provided by the central authorities - not to stimulate shipping, but as a defence strategy. However, no effective policy came about, due to provincial bickering over costs. In a struggle over sovereignty, moreover, Arnhem refused to allow the Council of State to supervise the works in its territory. Indeed, by 1672 the Rhine had become so shallow that French enemy troops experienced no difficulties at all in crossing the river.<sup>43</sup>

In comparison with waterways, roads over land were neglected even more. Their maintenance was delegated to local rural boards or *waterschappen*. For a long time, roads were made only to fill in the gaps in the network of waterways. Holland issued a decree in 1645 for the construction of roads, which was hardly efficacious. Again, more than any other province, Utrecht took care of its roads over land, in particular through ordinances of 1662 and 1666 stipulating general rules for the condition of roads and bridges. But frequent coach services came into being only after 1660. Coach travel was not very comfortable, as the first non-urban paved road dated only from 1671, connecting Hoorn to Enkhuizen.<sup>44</sup>

Although provincial action to stimulate trade was rare, it was not totally absent. Upon request, new tools and processes were granted patents. A patent typically granted exclusive rights to production for a certain number of years, mostly ten to fifteen, the province imposing penalties on the use of the invention without authorization. Renewals and methods learned abroad were protected too.<sup>45</sup>

An exceptionally strong protection existed for the herring fisheries, the 'mother trade' of the Dutch. A board was installed, in which the following cities held seats: Rotterdam, Den Briel, Delft, Schiedam, and Enkhuizen. This *College van de Grote Visserij* supervised trade, controlled the barrelling and salting of the fish, coordinated journeys, protected the vessels with convoys, collected taxes from the fishermen, and from 1625 even exerted high legal powers over the vessels and their crew. The board declined requests from new centres of herring fisheries wishing to be represented.

The central state supplemented protection of the fisheries with a couple of measures. Export of Dutch fishing boats was prohibited, and export of material for shipbuilding, such as rope and masts, was permitted only by explicit consent. Staves and herring barrels were not to be exported either, and high import duties were levied on foreign-caught herring. As for whaling, similar rules were imposed: Dutch sailors were not allowed to take part in whaling for another country, and materials for whaling were not to be exported.<sup>46</sup> As for other goods, few regulations existed at all. Madder, a typical Dutch crop used for dyeing, was protected by an export ban on its seeds and the necessary tools. A prohibition on the import of pepper and nutmeg was issued because of rumours about dilution of the Dutch East India spice trade. Similar rules prevented the mingling of hops and the dilution of flax with hemp in the 1620s.<sup>47</sup>

##### 5. Urban economic policies

Trade and industry were influenced less by the central state than by the urban *keuren*. Indeed, local government was given a boost by the Revolt at the expense of central power. City councils, whose members were predominantly chosen by co-option and only rarely by the guilds, saw their powers increase. The larger cities gained a significant say in the provincial government, and thus had a voice in increasing provincial taxes. The powers of judicial bodies remained largely unchanged, most responsibilities devolving to city sheriff and bailiffs. In some provinces, a higher court of appeal existed. But in the case of Holland the jurisdiction of such courts was quite limited, as any lawsuit against a city government could be appealed only after the city council in question had approved of the intervention.<sup>48</sup>

Towns, in general, took care of their own roads, bridges, embankments, culverts, fortifications, hygiene, and (at the end of the seventeenth century) lighting. To raise the necessary funds, the inhabitants of the street were often charged with additional duties, or neighbourhoods were charged explicitly with a task. Houses could be expropriated to make room for fortifications or market places. Polluting industries were located at the periphery, and dredgers were bought to keep canals and harbours clean. To increase security, a town like Hoorn stipulated in 1608 that all thatched roofs should be replaced by tiled ones. Firefighting was a semi-official task, which was extended after the fire engine was improved in the 1670s.<sup>49</sup>

At harbours and markets, taxes (weighage duties) were paid and wares were inspected on site. The unloading of ships was strictly regulated. For instance, peat had to be carried by official town carriers. Towns intervened in the way goods were sold on the market, and specific locations were assigned.<sup>50</sup>

For the protection of their trade overseas, cities housing one of the five boards of the admiralty cherished this institution. They aimed at the appointment of officers willing to listen to their faction's interests. Although all harbours could appeal to the service of the convoying vessels of the navy, some organized their own convoys too. Such companies were not always merely defensive: those with obvious pirating purposes sometimes received authorization from city councils.<sup>51</sup>

For transactions at home, a major step forward was the institution of the public bank of Amsterdam in 1609, the famous *Amsterdamse Wisselbank*. Originally, its main task was to combat disorder in money circulation, the city granting the new bank a monopoly on exchange. But the bank's role was extended such that any bill of exchange valued at more than six hundred guilders had to be deposited with the bank, with the result that almost all leading merchants held an account with the bank. Although the bank's statutes forbade the use of its stocks for commercial credits (funds were to be deposited only), a loan was granted to the East India Company in 1615, and again several times later during the period of the Republic. And in 1624, Amsterdam lent funds to the provincial government, drawn from the bank's funds. The capital was never paid back. The new town hall was partly financed by the bank too, and in 1650 the city advanced bank funds to the Stadhouder William II.<sup>52</sup>

Similar public banks, though none with a role comparable to the Amsterdam Bank, were set up in Middelburg (1616), Delft (1621), and Rotterdam (1635), all supervised by their respective city council. The Bank of Middelburg also advanced sums to both the East and the West India Companies. In addition, almost every major town had its own municipal lending bank. In Amsterdam, for example, the Bank van Leeninge was set up in 1614, advancing funds to small private ventures and major merchant enterprises alike. The establishment of these public banks lowered transaction costs significantly. Moreover, a Chamber of Assurance (also under supervision of city authorities) came to control the insurance business. The sale of goods was channelled increasingly through the public bourses (in Amsterdam since 1611). Price lists were published, for all to read. The general careful management of funds secured the existing system of property rights, which favoured the growth of commerce and allowed an unequalled accumulation of capital, with lower rates of interest than elsewhere.<sup>53</sup>

In this way, through the endorsement of local institutions like banks and bourses, city authorities pursued an active economic policy. They also judged over guild regulations. Some guilds were even erected by city authorities. But the guilds' claim of share in city government was small. During the Revolt, city authorities managed to further minimize the influence of the guilds, although it must be stated that guilds had traditionally been weak in the mercantile communities.<sup>54</sup>

In this respect Dutch guilds differed from similar bodies in other parts of Europe. But there were other differences as well. In contrast to most guilds in German cities, not all Dutch guilds had forced membership for persons engaged in their trade, and not always did the guilds own a monopoly on production. Many new industries had no guilds, for instance sugar and silk production in Amsterdam. Also, some guilds were loosely constructed and had few restrictions, whereas others included merchants or *reders*, whose interests were primarily in quality improvement. Dutch guilds were also less closely supervised by public authorities as compared to France, where guilds had been erected by the Crown with the purpose of benefiting the central government in Paris through the regulation of tax payments.<sup>55</sup>

One of the industries in which city governments showed great interest was shipbuilding. Land was consistently set aside for use by shipbuilders. There was a sharp increase in such development projects around 1600. Up to the late seventeenth century, cities frequently subsidized the development of new shipbuilding docks and constructed cranes for aiding native shipbuilding.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, urban economic policies supported the more traditional textile and beer industries.

Restrictions on production were imposed, nevertheless, by the power of city authorities to limit the number of masters and journeymen. As the Dutch economy grew, proprietors of smaller workshops demanded more protection against 'foreign' competition. New guilds came to be erected in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century too, even in the maritime trading centres. As for wages, however, local authorities meddled only to the extent of protecting

journeymen when master artisans tried to lower existing wage rates.<sup>57</sup>

Some guilds acted to prevent mechanization. In Rotterdam, a major fulling mill could not be erected, as city authorities feared violence from the journeymen. In Amsterdam, timber sawers protested the introduction of a sawmill, which was invented in 1592. They ultimately lost, however. In Leiden, in 1604, the guild of ribbon makers objected to mechanization by means of a ribbon loom producing up to twelve ribbons at the same time. At first, city authorities were prepared to listen to the guild's demands. Then, it was feared that production was going to shift to Delft (where the guild was more tolerant), and Leiden had the new loom installed after all.<sup>58</sup>

Obviously, intercity rivalries created possibilities for entrepreneurs bent on modernizing. Whereas the Utrecht guild of tick weavers was highly restrictive, Rotterdam and Schiedam gave this industry greater liberty. As central restrictions were absent in the Dutch Republic, crippling regulations imposed by guilds in one town could not seriously hamper the welfare of the rest.<sup>59</sup>

## 6. Settlement policy and the attraction of skilled workers

Another area having a major bearing on economic policy was the settlement of migrants. Towns manipulated the number of inhabitants by raising or lowering the requirements for citizenship (*poorterschap*), although one could often be an inhabitant (*ingezetene*) without being a burgher or *poorter*. For example, the rates for *poorterschap* in Amsterdam were increased in 1624, 1630, 1634, and again in 1650. *Ingezetenen*, however, enjoyed fewer privileges, whereas membership of most guilds was only open to *poorters*.<sup>60</sup>

A major influx of new inhabitants occurred during 1585-1595, continuing up to the 1620s, made up of fugitives from the Southern provinces. Exact numbers are unknown, yet estimates mention a level of 125,000. In some Northern cities (Leiden and Haarlem) as many as two-thirds of the inhabitants were refugees from the South. In the late seventeenth century, another substantial exodus followed, this time consisting of French Huguenots, numbering 50,000 to 75,000. They started to arrive in 1661, and the main wave followed in the 1680s.<sup>61</sup>

During these massive migrations, many city authorities pursued an active policy to attract the skilled artisans and merchants among the flow. They offered specific advantages, such as tax privileges, free housing, and free burghership, and even working capital bearing no rent. Often, the new settlers were allowed to practise their trade outside the guilds. At times, premiums were even paid. For example, in 1577 the city of Haarlem contracted Jan Hendriksz from Duffel in Brabant, who promised to work for six years in Haarlem in return for 72 guilders. In 1598 34 immigrants obtained sums ranging from 300 to 700 pounds for operating a loom in Haarlem. Rotterdam, likewise, offered privileges to immigrant Flemish entrepreneurs. Gouda converted six disused monasteries into workshops for weaving and dyeing tapestries, manned by Flemish refugees. In Leiden, Walloon immigrants introduced new mills for the fulling of woollen cloth in 1585, and the manufacture of light cloth was given a boost by refugees from Hondschoote. The new products opened up fresh markets and diversified production, making it less vulnerable to fluctuations in demand.<sup>62</sup>

Similarly, with the arrival of French Huguenots in the late seventeenth century, towns offered favourable settlement conditions for this new wave of entrepreneurs. As a result, several luxury trades were stimulated, mainly in printing and paper making, the manufacture of soft hats, silk and velvet, yarn and cambric, fans and printed wall paper, and glass.<sup>63</sup>

Other immigrants also benefited from favourable settlement conditions. In 1610, the city of Rotterdam attracted a large group of Portuguese Jewish merchants by allowing them to hold their own religious services. And weavers from Aken (Aix-la-Chapelle) who settled in Amsterdam in 1614 demanded, and got, a subsidy of 50 guilders for each loom.<sup>64</sup> In all, during the seventeenth century the Dutch Republic was a net recipient of immigrants from a large part of Europe. Living conditions in the maritime west of the Dutch Republic seemed attractive. And indeed, recent calculations have shown that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries purchasing power compared favourably with other major European countries.<sup>65</sup>

But urban settlement policies did not always yield a net profit for the region. Several towns in Holland tried to pinch skilled workers from each other. In 1595, Delft secretly attracted Flemish textile manufacturers living in Leiden by offering them 900 guilders, free housing, and free labour. Alkmaar persuaded the famous damask-producer Passchier Lammertijn to move from Haarlem by offering him an interest-free loan, free housing, and some orphans as unsalaried workers for his workshop. Also, eight major merchant-entrepreneurs in says and fustians left Leiden and settled in Haarlem, for which they received a premium of 1200 guilders each. And in 1616 Hoorn drew on the city budget to build houses for wool weavers from Alkmaar.<sup>66</sup>

Guilds could prove restrictive to the settlement of foreigners. At times, native-born craftsmen enjoyed priority,

such as in Amsterdam, where journeyman masons and carpenters had the right to demand expulsion of foreigners in case of insufficient work. In 1632, Amsterdam hatmakers were forbidden to contract foreigners. Foreign craftsmen could also be obliged to cede part of their wages to the guild. In The Hague, the period of training for immigrant linen weavers was doubled. Yet such regulations were by no means valid for all guilds or for all cities. Leiden's guilds, for example, had no such restrictive policies.<sup>67</sup>

Of course, public authorities were apt to clash with guilds, if they tried to attract skilled foreigners by compromising guild regulations. Frequently mentioned privileges granted by city authorities to immigrants were exemption from a master's test and exemption from guild dues. Guilds sometimes protested such actions on the part of the city; for example, in 1590 the Haarlem guild for carpenters and chest makers demanded that Flemish loom makers should pass a general master's test in carpentry. But the city declined the request in view of the enormous contribution of Flemish loom makers to the material well-being of the city.<sup>68</sup>

## 7. Welfare and health policies

As for welfare policies, the central state and the provinces left most of the work to local authorities. The running of many almshouses and orphanages was turned over to the city after the church applied to the city for support. Some health care was provided by doctors and midwives paid from city funds. Public schools were established, alongside the parochial ones.<sup>69</sup> And despite the lack of central legislation, the system of relief for the poor in the Dutch Republic was, by contemporary standards, relatively well organized. Foreign travellers noticed fewer vagrants and vagabonds roaming about than elsewhere. They praised charitable institutions for their number, wealth, and efficiency, and marvelled at the fact that the bread distributed as alms was made of wheat instead of the expected coarse rye.<sup>70</sup>

Of great importance is that during the Revolt monastic lands were confiscated. Revenues from church property had been used to maintain the clergy, but as the new clergy was radically reduced in size, funds were liberated for the purposes of charity and education. Indirectly, this policy influenced the level of literacy, which was quite high in comparison with other countries.<sup>71</sup>

As far as welfare is concerned, competition among religious sects proved advantageous. Almost every denomination maintained its own system of relief for the poor. Due to the requirement of the Calvinist church that one had to be a member in order to receive support, other churches organized their own relief to prevent loss of members. Welfare payments from the city were often no more than supplementary. In addition, some guilds had their own relief funds for widows, the elderly, and the disabled. But the number of poor seems to have increased dramatically during the early 1650s due to the first Anglo-Dutch War. Leiden, for example, was notorious for the large number of poor within its city walls. Amsterdam faced enormous difficulties in providing for the destitute, among whom were large numbers of Walloons. The cities were able to manage only by passing on costs to religious institutions.<sup>72</sup>

Although charity was widespread throughout the Republic, relief for the poor was not overly generous. Poorhouses and other relief for the poor invariably functioned under restrictions, such as requirements of church membership or several years' residence in the town. Unemployed and begging strangers were expelled from towns, or even from the province, as was the case in the province of Holland in 1589. Brass and tin workers coming from outside the province of Holland were refused admittance in 1608, 1622, 1623, and 1644. In Zeeland, it was even decided to return penniless Calvinist refugees to the Spanish-controlled territories. In addition, in almost all provinces, forced labour was practised in public workhouses, called *tuchthuizen*, *spinhuizen*, and *rasphuizen*, and on the town fortifications. Most orphanages boarded out (male) inmates over seven years of age too. Punishment in the form of assignment to galleys or forced labour for one of the India Companies was rare, though.<sup>73</sup>

Dutch charity as a whole could not provide a reasonable living standard for the working class. Therefore, Joel Mokyr's allegation that the welfare system raised the wage level must be discarded. The sums spent on relief for the poor were simply too small, and they were partly paid in kind, such as in bread and turf. But Dutch charity certainly did see to it that the lower classes did not starve, as was stated by Jan Luiten van Zanden recently, in particular during the low season and periods of high unemployment.<sup>74</sup>

Regulation of food prices supplemented the local welfare system. In times of dearth, such as in 1571/1573, 1585/1587, 1596/1597, 1624, and 1630/1631, towns issued *keuren* and *ordonnanties* to maintain the living standard of the poor. Such regulations included fixing maximum prices, inspecting wares, obliging wealthy burghers to store provisions, distributing bread, and even seizing food provisions. Prohibitions were issued for the transit and export of foodstuffs, for the production of starch, beer, and brandy, and for the baking of white bread, rusks, and cake. Advance buying (before goods entered the market), which forced prices up, was sometimes banned. In general, food

hoarding, monopolies, and speculation in trade were discouraged by local authorities as much as possible. Occasionally, such food-price regulations were even promulgated at the provincial level, such as in 1596 and 1630.<sup>75</sup>

Price policies existed for land too, for example when a city's boundaries were enlarged, to prevent speculation. Yet speculation was extremely difficult to combat, the more so as some magistrates profited from their own private businesses on the land market.<sup>76</sup> Towns had few regulations on house rents. Only rarely did they provide housing for the poor. However, rules as to the drafting of rental contracts did exist. Only written contracts came to be declared legal, first by town *keur* and after 1677 also by provincial law. Some cities also made provisions as to the terms of payment and the duties of tenants and landlords. Furthermore, many cities had a fixed day of removal, often the first of May.<sup>77</sup>

In addition to supervision of prices, cities pursued policies to prevent the spread of diseases, in particular the plague. They established *pesthuizen*, and caused the houses of the sick to be disinfected. Street gutters were cleaned and special *pestdoctoren* were appointed.<sup>78</sup> Although most of these regulations stemmed from local authorities, after the 1650s there was a trend towards centralization. The central government might have been motivated by fear that France, England, Scotland, Spain, and Portugal could refuse admittance of Dutch vessels to their harbours. Provincial health certificates were issued, declaring that goods came from plague-free regions. Moreover, provincial quarantines were imposed, whereas before, quarantines had been applied strictly locally. In 1664, far-reaching central measures were ordained by the States General concerning the examination and expulsion of sick travellers, and in 1679 was declared the first quarantine under the Republic.<sup>79</sup>

#### 8. *The advantage of competition ?*

In all, Dutch authorities protected existing property rights and mercantile pursuits reasonably well in comparison with other countries. An indirect approach to economic policy was actively pursued, by organizing sufficient defence and by providing for the poor and the sick. Trade transactions benefited from favourable bank and bourse policies. Once the standard coin had stabilized, major devaluations belonged to the past. Government spending generated strong demand in the areas of provisioning troops, shipbuilding, and the building of fortifications, as well as in the public debt. As for direct actions, some measures were enacted at the central level, such as the granting of monopolies to the large merchant companies. Yet the level of government that had the most impact on economic conditions was the local level, through guild policies, settlement regulations, and trade monopolies. Few government bodies, though, could be said to be economic actors, although some wharves were erected with public funds.

Following David Landes, the Dutch economy benefited from the presence of powerful, urban-based mercantile communities and the overarching invitation to compete. Competition also arose out of self-preservation and was enhanced by intercity rivalry. The different religious sects had a drive for competition too. Brothers and sisters of the same denomination supported each other, such as was the case for the Portuguese Jews, who became one of the wealthiest groups in Amsterdam. In the Zaanstreek was another example, the Mennonites, who used their capital to the advantage of their sect through a cohesive brotherhood structure.<sup>80</sup>

Obviously, the loose federal system of the Dutch Republic provided cities and provincial governments with ample opportunities to promote their own interests in the national arena. The burghers, who were responsible for paying war taxes, gained an enormous say in the body politic. Autonomy was generally sufficient to allow for differing measures. A great diversity of economic activity was the result, generally under the rule of 'freedom for oneself and restriction to others'.

The province of Holland, above all, benefited from the loose federal system, which provided Holland with opportunities to consolidate its economic upsurge. As this wealthy and commercial province had the most to gain from a smoothly functioning and effective central government, its political leaders (like Oldenbarnevelt and De Witt) played a prominent role in national policy-making. Foreign policy was, of course, of great relevance to the mercantile interests of Holland. In this respect, the 'close economic collaboration of a network of maritime towns, inland manufacturing towns, fishing ports, and inland specialized agriculture', as mentioned by Jonathan Israel,<sup>81</sup> was biased towards aiding the commercial policies of Holland. The power of the central state, albeit reduced, favoured peace and quiet for European trade (so important for Holland's ruling cliques), even though this conflicted frequently with the interests of industry (which benefited from high wartime tariffs on imports) and of colonial traders (who benefited during war from attacks on the possessions of other countries).

Not all sectors benefited from the Dutch federal system. It was disadvantageous for almost all rural production inland, and for internal trade, which was hampered so much by intercity rivalries. Like all central measures, nationwide stimulation and protection of trade was contingent on coalitions among cities, and between Holland and

other provinces. And when discord ruled in Holland itself, the whole procedure of decision-making tended to drag on for months or even years. In the provincial assemblies and in the States General, the right of veto on matters concerning war and finance frequently blocked effective action in foreign politics. Notoriously bad was the financing of the navy throughout the period of the Republic. For years, Dutch convoys were powerless against the Dunkirk privateers, whereas rivers at the eastern borders failed to be deepened. Major missteps occurred too, such as the selling off of Dutch men-of-war after peace was signed in 1648, with the result that the Dutch navy had no chance against the English navy in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-1654.<sup>82</sup>

As long as Dutch wealth was based on expanding commerce, while other countries were in serious turmoil or experienced the adverse effects of the seventeenth century crisis, the federal system worked and the limited amount of protection proved sufficient. However, as foreign competition became more fierce, in particular after 1650-1670, the ad hoc measures were inadequate. As Jonathan Israel failed to deal with the Dutch state in less successful circumstances, his *Dutch Primacy of World Trade* speaks too positively of the influence of government authority during the Republic.<sup>83</sup> The development of economic forces on a nationwide scale was seriously hampered by the federal character of the Dutch state. In the end, the same complex of power relations that had stimulated competition also came to weaken the international economic position of the Dutch by the beginning of the eighteenth century.

## NOTES

\*.. Translation: ###

1.. D.S. Landes, *The unbound Prometheus; Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present* (Cambridge 1969) 20, 31. On the impact of cities upon state formation see also C. Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990* (Oxford 1990) 47-53, and W.P. Blockmans, 'Voracious states and obstructing cities: An aspect of state formation in preindustrial Europe', *Theory and Society* 18 (1989) 733-755.

2.. R. Fruin, *Tien jaren uit den Tachtigjarigen Oorlog 1588-1598* (Den Haag 1899) 34; J. Huizinga, *Dutch civilisation in the seventeenth century and other essays* (London 1968) 152; J.L. Price, *Culture and society in the Dutch Republic during the seventeenth century* (London 1974) 16-17; M. Prak, 'Republiek en vorst; De stadhouders en het staatsvormingsproces in de Noordelijke Nederlanden, 16e-18e eeuw', *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 16 (1989) 38.

3.. J.I. Israel, *Dutch primacy in world trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford 1989) 94-5, 411.

4.. H.L. Zwitser, *De militie van den staat; Het leger van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Amsterdam 1991) 14, 62-63; M.C. 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state; War, politics and finance during the Dutch Revolt* (Manchester 1993) 34.

5.. Based upon the annual petitions and consents of the provinces in the States General. M.C. 't Hart, 'Public finance 1550-1700', ###, *A financial history of the Netherlands, 1550-1990* [forthcoming].

6.. J.E. Elias, *De vlootbouw in Nederland in de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw 1596-1655* (Amsterdam 1933) 9, 33-3; J.R. Bruijn, 'Mercurius en Mars uiteen; De uitrusting van de oorlogsvloot in de zeventiende eeuw', S. Groenveld *et al.* (eds), *Bestuurders en geleerden* (Amsterdam 1985) 102; R.W. Unger, *Dutch shipbuilding before 1800; Ships and guilds* (Assen 1978) 64.

7.. J.J. Roovers, *De plaatselijke belastingen en financiën in den loop der tijden* (Alphen aan den Rijn 1932) 30; A.C.M. Kappelhof, *De belastingheffing in de Meierij van Den Bosch gedurende de Generaliteitsperiode (1648-1730)* (Tilburg 1986) 288-300; Zwitser, *De militie van den staat*, 22-23; R. Willemsen, *Enkhuizen tijdens de Republiek; Een economisch-historisch onderzoek naar stad en samenleving van de 16e tot de 19e eeuw* (Hilversum 1988) 30; E.R.M. Taverne, *In 't land van belofte: in de nieuwe stad; Ideaal en werkelijkheid van de stadsuitleg in de Republiek, 1580-1680* (Maarssen 1978) 53-59.

8.. 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state*, 196; J.R. Bruijn & J. Lucassen, *Op de schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Groningen 1980) 18; Zwitser, *De militie van den staat*, 42-43, 61.

9.. P.H. Engels, *De belastingen en de geldmiddelen van den aanvang der Republiek tot op heden* (Utrecht 1862) 71; Kappelhof, *De belastingheffing in de Meierij*, 79-126; H.E. Becht, *Statistische gegevens betreffende den handelsoverzet van de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden gedurende de 17e eeuw (1579-1715)* (Den Haag 1908). The term Generality lands was conferred in 1648 to the regions in Brabant, Flanders, Overmaze, and Westerwolde that had been reconquered from the Spanish.

10.. Zwitser, *De militie van den staat*, 71.

11.. Drenthe was the only constituent province that did not have the right to vote, as it was too poor to send a delegation. The generality lands (see previous footnote), however, located at the borders of the Republic, were ruled by the Council of State. As for the conquered territories overseas, these were ruled by the East and West India Companies.

12.. The blockade of Antwerp could be extended by intensive patrolling of the Flemish coast, preventing smaller harbours from organizing the provisioning of Antwerp again. J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic world 1606-1661* (Oxford 1986) 145-146; W.S. Unger, *Geschiedenis van Middelburg in omtrek* (Middelburg 1966) 43; J.H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand 1572-1609* (Utrecht 1931) I: 83. A blockade was imposed on east Frisian harbours in the first decades of the Eighty Years' War too: *Ibidem*, 206.

13.. W.D. Voorthuysen, *De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en het mercantilisme* (Den Haag 1965) 70-71.

14.. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 145-149, 218-221, 282.

15.. J.A. van Houtte, *An economic history of the Low Countries 800-1800* (London 1977) 203, 291; Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 46, 73, 88.

16.. P.W. Klein, 'De Nederlandse handelspolitiek in de tijd van het mercantilisme: een nieuwe kijk op een oude kwestie?', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 102 (1989) 2: 206.

17.. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand*, 33, 115; Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 31.

18.. See also the article by Thomas Lindblad in this volume. In fact, the duties of 1650s increased by an average of 22%. Additional duties could be imposed for tonnage and convoy, often for specific trade routes. In 1649, as a treaty with Denmark had replaced the Sound tolls by a lump sum, a tax on Baltic navigation was imposed. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 291; Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand*, 147-149.

19.. A. Bijl Mz, *De Nederlandse convooidienst; De maritieme bescherming van koopvaardij en zeevisserij tegen piraten en oorlogsgevaar in het verleden* (Den Haag 1951) 74; J.R. Bruijn, 'Scheepvaart in de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1580-1650', *Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (Haarlem 1980) VII: 140.

- 20.. J.L.F. Engelhard, *Het generaalplakkaat van 31 juli 1725 op de convoaien en licenten en het lastgeld op de schepen* (Assen 1970) 320-323.
- 21.. H.H. Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672* (Princeton 1978) 188-189; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 59, 89, 384, 432-434.
- 22.. H.E. van Gelder, *De Nederlandse munten* (Utrecht 1965) 76-80, 92-96.
- 23.. Van Gelder, *De Nederlandse munten*, 102; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 215, 296.
- 24.. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 215, 297-298, 301.
- 25.. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 154, 201; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 6, 14, 29, 42; A. van Braam, *Bloei en verval van het economisch-sociale leven aan de Zaan in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Wormerveer u.d.) 134; Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 86.
- 26.. The States of Holland were composed of nineteen members, eighteen thereof from the major cities and one for the nobility. In Zeeland, six city votes stood against one vote for the nobles. In Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, and Groningen the delegates of cities and noblemen held one another in balance, whereas in Friesland and Drenthe rural representatives were strongest. S.W. Verstegen, *Gegoede ingezetenen; Jonkers en geërfden op de Veluwe 1650-1830* (Zutphen 1989) 51; M.J.A.V. Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur naar gemeentebestuur* (Den Haag 1973) 51-52; M.C. 't Hart, 'Cities and statemaking in the Dutch Republic, 1580-1680', *Theory and Society* 18 (1989) 666-668.
- 27.. 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state*, ch. 5.
- 28.. J. Jacobsen Jensen, 'Moryson's reis door en zijn karakteristiek van de Nederlanden', *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 39 (1918) 267; C.D. van Strien, *British travellers in Holland during the Stuart period; Edward Browne and John Locke as tourists in the United Provinces* (Amsterdam 1989) 136-138; J.M.F. Fritschy, *De patriotten en de financiën van de Bataafse Republiek* (Amsterdam 1988) 52-54. In the Zaanstreek, several industries complained about the tax burden on grinding corn, starch, and peat. Van Braam, *Bloei en verval*, 135-136.
- 29.. This development was based on the financial revolution in the sixteenth century. J.D. Tracy, *A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands; Renten and renteniers in the county of Holland, 1515-1565* (Berkeley 1985) 3; E.H.M. Dormans, *Het tekort; Staatsschuld in de tijd der Republiek* (Amsterdam 1991) 26, 71; 't Hart, 'Cities and statemaking', 678.
- 30.. The federal debt emerged in the 1590s and rose to over 16 million guilders in the 1660s. Dormans, *Het tekort*, 139-140.
- 31.. M.C. 't Hart, 'Public loans and lenders in the seventeenth century Netherlands', *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands* 1 (1989), 133.
- 32.. 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state*, 143, notes a relatively lighter tax burden for country dwellers as compared to town dwellers. J. de Vries, *The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700* (New Haven/London 1974) 213.
- 33.. De Vries, *The Dutch rural economy*, 197; Willemsen, *Enkhuizen*, 21; C. Postma, *Het hoogheemraadschap van Delfland in de middeleeuwen 1289-1589* (Hilversum 1989) 84; Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur*, 35-36; H. van der Linden, 'Les communautés rurales en Hollande de la fin de l'époque mérovingienne à la Révolution Française', *Les communautés rurales; Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin* 44 (1987) 481-482; H.S. Danner, 'Droogmakerijen in de zeventiende eeuw', E.H. Walhuis & M.H. Boetes (eds), *Strijd tegen het water; Het beheer van land en water in het Zuiderzeegebied* (Zutphen 1992) 53.
- 34.. But no action was undertaken. J.W. Koopmans, *De Staten van Holland en de Opstand; De ontwikkeling van hun functies en organisatie in de periode 1544-1588* (Den Haag 1990), 165; Z.Y. van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat als taak van het landsbestuur in de Republiek der Vereenigde Provinciën* (Delft u.d.) 65-68, 70, 79, 97.
- 35.. Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 152-153. Inland, in the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland, little concern was shown for waterworks, as only the Quarter of Nijmegen had decided upon general dike regulations. Gelderland, however, did act occasionally in cases of flagrant neglect of dikes, such as in 1611 for the polder of Arkenheem. *Ibidem*, 139-140.
- 36.. Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 103-104, 113-115, 126; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 142.
- 37.. Postma, *Het hoogheemraadschap*, 342-343; Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 92-96, 125-126, 147-148; Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur*, 27; A.J. Thurkoff, 'De Friese en Hollandse droogmakerijen; Een vergelijking', E.H. Walhuis & M.H. Boetes (eds), *Strijd tegen het water; Het beheer van land en water in het Zuiderzeegebied* (Zutphen 1992) 66.
- 38.. E.C.G. Brünner, *De order op de buitennering van 1531* (Utrecht 1918) 116 ff; Z.W. Sneller, 'De opkomst van de plattelandsnijverheid in de 17e en 18e eeuw', *Economisch-Historische Herdrukken* (Den Haag 1964) 117; L. Noordegraaf, 'Internal trade and internal trade conflicts in the Northern Netherlands; Autonomy, centralism, and state formation in the pre-industrial era', *Britain and the Netherlands* 10 (1992) 17.
- 39.. The act of 1531 was revived by reprints during the seventeenth century and debated in the States of Holland. Brünner, *De order op de buitennering*, 196; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 157; P.G. Bos, *Het Groningsche gild- en stapelrecht tot de reductie in 1594* (Wolters, 1904) 366-367; N.W. Posthumus, *De neringen in de Republiek* (n.p. u.d.) 10; Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 106.
- 40.. The towns of Holland, perceiving the Zaan as a direct threat to their own industries, reacted by prohibiting inhabitants from having ships built or repaired outside the city walls. Unger, *Dutch shipbuilding*, 8, 84; Van Braam, *Bloei en verval*, 62; Sneller, 'De opkomst van de plattelandsnijverheid', 121-122; M.A. Verkade, *De opkomst van de Zaanstreek* (Utrecht 1952); C.A. de Feyter, *Industrial policy and shipbuilding; Changing economic structures in the Low Countries 1600-1980* (Utrecht 1982) 141.
- 41.. Noordegraaf, 'Internal trade', 19.
- 42.. J. de Vries, *Barges and capitalism; Passenger transportation in the Dutch economy (1632-1839)* (AAG Bijdragen 21 (1978)/Utrecht 1981) 51, 56, 61-62, 89, 129; J.M. Fuchs, *Beurt en wagenveren* (Den Haag 1946) 22, 30-32, 198; Postma, *Het hoogheemraadschap*, 290; J. Tersteeg, 'Een bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der binnenlandsche vaart', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* Vierde Reeks III-3 (1903) 162-184; Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 16-18, 100, 170.
- 43.. Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 128, 130-133, 144, 148-149; G.P. van de Ven, *Aan de wieg van Rijkswaterstaat; Wordingsgeschiedenis van het Pannerdens kanaal* (Zutphen 1976) 28-29, 64.
- 44.. Van de Ven, *Aan de wieg*, 336-356; Postma, *Het hoogheemraadschap*, 321; Van der Meer, *Het opkomen van den waterstaat*, 99, 149, 162.
- 45.. Such patents could also be granted by the federal government, bearing upon the whole territory of the Republic, and occasionally by a city government. G. Doorman, *Octrooien voor uitvindingen in de Nederlanden uit de 16e-18e eeuw* (Den Haag 1940) 20, 32.
- 46.. Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 53-60, 76.
- 47.. Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 61, 73-74, 79, 88, 95.
- 48.. Fruin, *Tien jaren*, 48; Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur*, 20-21.

- 49.. J.C.N. Raadschelders, *Plaatselijke bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen 1600-1980; Een historisch-bestuurskundig onderzoek in vier Noord-Hollandse gemeenten* (Den Haag 1990) 76, 90-91; Willemsen, *Enkhuizen*, 30-34; W.B. Peteri, *Overheidsbemoeiingen met stedenbouw tot den vrede van Munster* (Alkmaar 1913) 42-44, 53-58, 68-71; E. Slot, *Vijf gulden eeuwen; Momenten uit 500 jaar gemeentefinanciën* (Amsterdam 1990) 66; Taverne, *In 't land van belofte*, 136.
- 50.. Taverne, *In 't land van belofte*, 171; Raadschelders, *Plaatselijke bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen*, 87-88; R. de Vries, 'Crisis en sociale politiek in Enkhuizen, 1650-1850', *Barre Tijden; Crisis en sociale politiek rondom de Zuiderzee, 1650-1850* (Zutphen 1989) 47-48.
- 51.. For example the *Commercie Compagnie* in Middelburg of 1643-1646; Unger, *Geschiedenis van Middelburg*, 51. As for manipulation of the appointment of officers, see 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state*, 206.
- 52.. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 217, 304; Slot, *Vijf gulden eeuwen*, 55, 59.
- 53.. D.C. North, *Structure and change in economic history* (New York 1981) 153-154; V. Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the seventeenth century* (Ann Arbor 1963) 44; G. Parker, 'The emergence of modern finance in Europe', C.M. Cipolla (ed.), *The Fontana Economic History of Europe* (Hassocks 1977) II: 550; Unger, *Geschiedenis van Middelburg*, 49-50.
- 54.. Fruin, *Tien jaren*, 41-42; Fuchs, *Beurt en wagenveren*, 20, 143 ff.
- 55.. Posthumus, *De neringen*, 2-5, 15, 20; Unger, *Dutch shipbuilding*, 65-66; Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam*, 71; I.H. van Eeghen, *De gilden; Theorie en praktijk* (Bussum 1965) 13-19; W. van Ravensteyn, *Onderzoekingen over de economische en sociale ontwikkelingen van Amsterdam gedurende de 16de en het eerste kwart der 17de eeuw* (Amsterdam 1906) 45-54; J.L. van Zanden, *Arbeid tijdens het handelskapitalisme; Opkomst en neergang van de Hollandse economie 1350-1850* (Bergen 1991) 147; H.P.H. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam 1540-1860; Een relaas over demografie, economie en sociale politiek van een wereldstad* (Amsterdam 1985) 149-150.
- 56.. Locations were assigned also because of the danger of fire: wharves were storehouses for quantities of wood, whereas fire was used for preparing timber, and pitch and tar were melted for caulking. Unger, *Dutch shipbuilding*, 64-65, 115; De Feyter, *Industrial policy*, 146.
- 57.. De Feyter, *Industrial policy*, 144; C. Wiskerke, *De afschaffing der gilden in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1938) 80-81, 84, 88; Bos, *Het Groningsche gild- en stapelrecht*, 101, 367; Van Ravensteyn, *Onderzoekingen*, 162-165.
- 58.. A.Th. van Deursen, *Het kopergeld van de Gouden Eeuw* (Assen 1981) I: 21; J.G. van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten; Handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek* (Den Haag 1970) 176, 197; Doorman, *Octrooien*, 56-57.
- 59.. The States of Holland were generally modest in handling guild disputes, referring requests back to the home town of the claimant. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 164; Doorman, *Octrooien*, 12; Wiskerke, *De afschaffing der gilden*, 54, 57-58.
- 60.. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid*, 144-147.
- 61.. J.G.C.A. Briels, *Zuidnederlanders in de Republiek 1572-1630; Een demografische en cultuurhistorische studie* (Sint Niklaas 1985) 213; J. Lucassen & R. Penninx, *Nieuwkomers; Immigranten en hun nakomelingen in Nederland 1550-1985* (Amsterdam 1985) 32-34.
- 62.. L. Noordegraaf, '... een herberghe voor alle verjaeghde ende verdreven lieden ...; Haarlem als toevluchtsoord voor Zuid-Nederlanders omstreeks 1600', *Antwerpen-Haarlem* (Amsterdam 1990) 4-5; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 163; Willemsen, *Enkhuizen*, 33; H. Bots, G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes & F. Wieringa (eds), *Vlucht naar de vrijheid; De hugenoten en de Nederlanders* (Amsterdam 1985) 70, 73-74; Briels, *Zuidnederlanders*, 127, 132; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 159.
- 63.. Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 287; Bots (ed.), *Vlucht naar de vrijheid*, 70, 73-74.
- 64.. Voorthuysen, *De Republiek*, 88; Briels, *Zuidnederlanders*, 145.
- 65.. L. Noordegraaf, *Hollands welvaren?; Levensstandaard in Holland 1450-1650* (Bergen 1985) 172; J. Lucassen, *Naar de kusten van de Noordzee; Trekarbeid in Europees perspectief, 1600-1900* (Gouda 1984) 171; Van Zanden, *Arbeid*, 74, 169.
- 66.. Briels, *Zuidnederlanders*, 137; Noordegraaf, '... een herberghe', 5; Peteri, *Overheidsbemoeiingen*, 45.
- 67.. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid*, 144-147; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 160; Van Zanden, *Arbeid*, 62; Van Deursen, *Het kopergeld*, I: 57-58.
- 68.. Van Eeghen, *De gilden*, 12.
- 69.. Raadschelders, *Plaatselijke bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen*, 60; Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur*, 22; Roovers, *De plaatselijke belastingen*, 8, 24; H.J. Koenen, *Voorlezingen over de geschiedenis der finantien van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam 1885) 130-131; Slot, *Vijf gulden eeuwen*, 81.
- 70.. Van Strien, *British travellers in Holland*, 143.
- 71.. De Vries, *The Dutch rural economy*, 210-211; see also A.J. Mensema & A.J. Gevers, 'De Staten als souvereinen van Overijssel 1578-1795', *In Alle Staten* (Zwolle 1978) 49; Taverne, *In 't land van belofte*, 179.
- 72.. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid*, 152-153, 161, 165; Unger, *Geschiedenis van Middelburg*, 54; Van Deursen, *Het kopergeld*, I: 20. Pensions out of the central budget were used mainly to pay army officers who were temporarily out of service. Few widows of sailors and soldiers received a pension at all, often just for a couple of months, and then only strictly for those who had claims as to arrears in payment. Wounded and disabled soldiers could eventually receive a small sum too, such as twelve or eighteen guilders for the loss of an arm or a leg. *Ibidem*, 48-49; Zwitzer, *De militie van den staat*, 99.
- 73.. D. Damsma, 'De sociaal-politieke ontwikkelingen in Nederland in comparatief perspectief', *Barre tijden; Crisis en sociale politiek rondom de Zuiderzee, 1650-1850* (Zutphen 1989) 25, 31; Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid*, 144, 161, 170; Van Houtte, *An economic history*, 160, 287, 290; Van Deursen, *Het kopergeld*, I: 80-84; Raadschelders, *Plaatselijke bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen*, 80; Briels, *Zuidnederlanders*, 117; Kocken, *Van stads- en plattelandsbestuur*, 23.
- 74.. J. Moky, *Industrialization in the Low Countries, 1795-1850* (New Haven 1976) 197; Van Zanden, *Arbeid*, 172-173; see also J. de Vries, 'An inquiry into the behaviour of wages in the Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands, 1580-1800', *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae* 10 (1978) 91-92. Welfare policies became more restrictive, in particular after 1682. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid*, 163-164, 168.
- 75.. Not only corn was bought in advance ? butter, livestock, and meat suffered from these practices too. Magistrates could also request church authorities to increase their generosity, and ask for prayer-meetings and processions. L. Noordegraaf, 'Dearth, plague and trade; Economy and politics in the Northern Netherlands, fifteenth to nineteenth centuries', *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands* 1 (1989) 51; R. de Vries, 'Crisis en sociale politiek', 48.
- 76.. Willemsen, *Enkhuizen*, 30.

- 77.. C.M. Lesger, *Huur en conjunctuur; De woningmarkt in Amsterdam, 1550-1850* (Amsterdam 1986) 23-28, 31. For rare examples of housing for the poor, see: Van Deursen, *Het kopersgeld*, III: 50; Taverne, *In 't land van belofte*, 185.
- 78.. Noordegraaf, 'Dearth, plague, and trade', 56.
- 79.. Noordegraaf, 'Dearth, plague and trade', 58-59.
- 80.. Van Braam, *Bloei en verval*, 56-58.
- 81.. Israel, *Dutch primacy*, 415.
- 82.. 'T Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state*, 59.
- 83.. Israel, *Dutch primacy*, 16-17, 37, 95, 188-189, 269, 411-415. The same author gives a less rosy view of the Dutch state in his excellent article 'The Holland towns and the Dutch-Spanish conflict, 1621-1648', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 94 (1979) 41-69. See also Klein, 'De Nederlandse handelspolitiek', 206.